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T his chapter aims to provide a concise overview of evolutions in European Union (EU) trade policy towards developing countries. In line with the general purpose of this volume, it also consid-
ers the importance of Commissioner Cecilia Malmström’s Trade for All 
(2015) strategy in this regard. Ever since the early years of European 
integration, an ethical agenda towards the Global South has been 
proclaimed. The Schuman Declaration of May 9th 1950 declared “the 
development of the African continent” to be “one of its [Europe’s] 
essential tasks” and part four of the Treaty of Rome of 1957 was 
dedicated to privileged trade and aid relations with “the Overseas 
Countries and Territories”. Subsequent the Yaoundé (1963, 1969) and 
Lomé conventions (1975, 1980, 1985, 1990) and the Cotonou (2000) 
Agreement continued the special trade-and-aid relationship with mem-
ber states’ former colonies assembled in the African, Caribbean and 
Pacific (ACP) group, larded with an ethical development discourse. 
Since the 1960s and 1970s, Europe has also established preferential 
trade agreements with countries in eastern Europe and in the southern 
Mediterranean. In a practical application of wider calls by developing 
countries for a New International Economic Order (NIEO), the European 
Community was the first to create a Generalised System of Preferences 
(GSP) in 1971, thereby enhancing Asian and Latin American coun-
tries’ access to its market. Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, the EU’s 
growing market size and political profile further substantiated the con-
ception of its role as a leading and “normative” power. This resulted 
in a number of highly symbolic trade-related initiatives towards the 
developing world: the “Everything but Arms” (EBA) initiatives provid-
ing duty-free and quota-free access for the least-developed countries 
(LDCs) (2001), the calls led by the EU for a Development Round of the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) in the lead-up to Doha Conference 
(2001), the elaboration of the GSP+ system with sustainable develop-
ment and governance trade conditionality (2005), and the EU Aid for 
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Trade Strategy (2007) all seemed to underpin this image of an ethical 
actor towards the Global South. One decade later, however, it remains 
unclear how successful the EU has been. A number of internal and 
international evolutions have challenged both the EU’s “normative” 
and “power” profiles.
While a thorough evaluation of the EU’s trade relations with 
developing countries is beyond the scope of this chapter, we aim to 
take a bird’s eye view by discerning three ostensibly incompatible 
evolutions that have taken place over the past decade. First, trade 
relations with developing countries have become a lesser priority 
for the EU. Second, the EU has forcefully continued its liberalisation 
agenda towards these countries. Third, it has also pursued ethical 
values through trade. We will outline each of these evolutions and 
consider how they might be interlinked. In conclusion, we will reflect 
on how this triangle may not be impossible after all.
A lesser priority
Poorer developing countries, including many ACP countries, have 
lost their central position in the EU’s external orbit. While the former 
colonies long stood at the top of the EU’s “pyramid of preferences”, 
their position has been eroded. This has been a gradual evolution that 
came clearly to the surface when negotiating the follow-up to the Lomé 
system. In a Green Paper on the EU’s relations with the ACP countries 
in the 21st century published in 1996, the European Commission clearly 
signalled that trade relations with these countries should be revamped. 
For a number of political, legal, normative and economic reasons, the 
EU was no longer willing to negotiate a “waiver” justifying the special 
trade system with these countries in the WTO. This “normalisation”, 
or according to some, “banalisation”, of the ACP group became clear 
in the Cotonou Agreement (2000), which set the stage for Economic 
Partnership Agreements (EPA) between the EU and ACP regions. The 
EPAs would replace the non-reciprocal trade liberalisation of the Lomé 
system by reciprocal (yet still asymmetrical) free trade. The EPAs would 
be negotiated between the EU and six sub-regions of the ACP group 
and go beyond merely tariffs to also include behind-the-border issues. 
Moreover, trade-and-aid schemes echoing the NIEO ideology of the 
1960s and 1970s, such as Stabex, Sysmin, and commodity protocols 
providing fixed quota and prices for bananas, sugar and rum, were 
gradually abandoned. At the same time, the EBA initiative did enhance 
market access for the poorest countries in the world. Cynically, however, 
EBA contributed to undermining the position of the ACP group and 
dismantling the commodity protocols, while its impact in terms of 
growth and welfare remains doubtful. 
This trend manifested itself even more clearly in 2006 when the then 
Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson launched the Global Europe – 
Competing in the World trade strategy for the EU. Henceforth, the 
growing and emerging economies clearly became the focal point of 
EU trade policy. The rationale underlying this strategy was explicitly 
framed in terms of economic interests. Global Europe states that 
while the EU’s trade agreements serve development objectives well, 
“our main trade interests, including in Asia, are less well served”, 
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adding that “for trade policy to help create jobs and drive growth, 
economic factors must play a primary role in the choice of future 
FTAs”. Concretely, Global Europe instigated trade negotiations 
with South Korea, India, ASEAN, Central America, and the Andean 
Community. While EPA negotiations continued to muddle on, and 
the Doha Development Round also found itself in an impasse, the EU 
started to play the game of “competitive liberalisation”, as a result 
of which the ACP countries as well as the LDCs witness even more 
preference erosion. 
Interestingly, the drive for free trade agreements with emerging 
economies was further strengthened by the EU’s reaction to the 
economic and financial crisis, based on the belief that more trade 
and investment is an important dimension of Europe’s recovery 
strategy. Furthermore, the crisis served to legitimate new bilateral 
agreements with industrialised countries such as Canada, Japan and, 
most importantly, the United States. While industrialised countries had 
historically figured at the bottom of Europe’s “pyramid of preferences”, 
these countries were catapulted to become core trading partners, 
engaging in a hitherto unseen degree of liberalisation through tariff 
reductions and regulatory arrangements. The negotiations on a 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) with the US is 
particularly noteworthy in this regard. Against the backdrop of the 
economic recession, the then European Commission President José 
Manuel Barroso argued that the agreement would be “a boost to our 
economies that doesn’t cost a cent”. 
These dynamics have led to the trade agreements signed with Korea 
(2010), with Central America (2012), and with Peru and Colombia 
(also 2012; with Ecuador joining in 2016). Trade negotiations with 
Canada were finished in 2014. In the same year, the EU signed trade 
agreements with Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova. While bi-regional 
negotiations with ASEAN turned out to be complicated, the EU 
concluded separate agreements with Singapore (2014) and Vietnam 
(2016). Negotiations with Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand and the 
Philippines are ongoing, which is also the case for India and Japan. 
Negotiations with Mercosur have been relaunched, whereas the trade 
agreement with Mexico is being renegotiated. Trade negotiations with 
New Zealand and Australia have also been announced. 
The principle of “differentiation” between developing countries had 
gradually established itself in EU trade and development discourse by 
the end of the first decade of the 2000s. It has justified a far-reaching 
reform of the GSP, which entailed the graduation of more than 80 
high- and middle-income countries since 2014. This also pushed a 
number of middle-income countries, such as Ecuador, which would 
otherwise lose their preferential access to the European market, to 
negotiate a bilateral trade agreement. Although the EU has continued 
the EPA negotiations, it is clear that the member states’ former 
colonies, and the world’s poorest countries more broadly, no longer 
occupy an important place in this trade agenda. If they ever were the 
EU’s most preferential trading partners, this is certainly no longer the 
case today. Apart from tariff erosion and attentive diversion, the new 
agreements also entail risks of trade diversion for the ACP countries 
and LDCs. 




Notwithstanding the declining relevance of developing countries in 
Europe’s trade policy, the liberalisation agenda of Cotonou has been 
forcefully applied and even reinforced. EU-ACP relations over the 
past decade have been dominated by the discussions on EPAs. Many 
commentators have discussed and criticised the EPA negotiations, 
focusing on issues such as the impact of trade liberalisation on 
domestic economies in Africa, the EU’s missionary zeal for reciprocal 
free trade, the uncertainties about what “WTO compatibility” means 
in this regard, the pros and cons of the bi-regional frameworks, 
the dynamics within ACP regions, the impact of European business 
interests, the near-absence of compensating development aid, the 
divide-and-rule negotiation tactics of European negotiators, the 
rhetorical negotiation strategies by their ACP counterparts, the role 
of political and economic elites in the ACP, the perceived image 
damage to the EU, the successful lobby campaigns by transnational 
non-governmental organisations, etc. The picture that emerges from 
more than a decade of intense EPA negotiations is one of a complex 
hotchpotch of trade arrangements. While only one – the Caribbean 
region – signed a full EPA by the original deadline, several others 
signed “light” EPAs and continued to negotiate, while still others 
decided to revert to the GSP or the EBA arrangement. 
There is however a clear and successful (according to EU standards) 
liberalisation logic behind these evolutions. First, the number of 
ACP countries signing an EPA has increased in recent years. In 2014 
the southern African (SADC), west African (ECOWAS) and east 
African (EAC) groups decided to sign an EPA with the EU. Although 
negotiations have been lengthy and tough, and the EPAs are not 
yet ratified (let alone implemented), it seems that with some delay 
the EU will eventually have managed to finalise its EPA agenda. The 
prospect of falling back to the less generous GSP system, which has 
been used as a threat by the EU, has most likely affected the eventual 
effectiveness of its approach. In addition, the EU did make concessions 
on asymmetrical liberalisation, development aid funding, and the 
scope of the agreement. Nevertheless, it is important to notice that 
the EU has largely realised its liberalisation agenda as it was already 
suggested – long before the Global Europe strategy – in the 1996 
Green Paper. 
Second, the non-signatories of EPAs also eventually comply with the 
EU’s wider agenda to pursue WTO-compatible trade arrangements. 
Since the countries that do not take part in EPA schemes fall back to 
EBA or GSP, they are fully consistent with the WTO philosophy. Indeed, 
over the past decade they have shifted from “waived” non-reciprocal 
market access towards “WTO-compatible” non-reciprocal market access 
as allowed under the “Enabling Clause” of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT, the predecessor of the WTO). In other words, 
the African countries’ trade relations with the EU have been radically 
restructured in order to streamline them in line with WTO requirements. 
“WTO compatibility” – the EU’s leitmotif in the Cotonou negotiations 
– has been achieved. Even if questions on the legality of the EPAs may 
remain, this is unlikely to be challenged. Also, countries that are not 
members of the WTO signed bilateral trade agreements. This successful 
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political outcome of the so-called “failed” EPAs – at least by European 
standards – has often been overlooked. While the picture of African 
trade arrangements with the EU looks complex, the end result of a long 
decade of negotiations displays a distinct liberalisation logic.
Third, an increasing number of non-ACP developing countries that 
previously benefited from the GSP has been negotiating bilateral free 
trade agreements with the EU. This means that these countries have 
also given up non-reciprocal market access in exchange for (more far-
reaching) mutual trade liberalisation. As emphasised above, the EU 
used “hard power” tactics in this regard, not least through the GSP 
graduation of higher and middle-income countries (see above). The 
number of GSP+ beneficiaries may also decrease as more countries 
engage in bilateral trade negotiations. For instance, Colombia and 
Peru, the Central American countries, and Georgia have shifted from 
GSP+ to free trade agreements. The Philippines became a new GSP+ 
beneficiary in 2015, but later that year free trade negotiations were 
also started.
In conclusion, the EU’s trade agenda towards developing countries has 
been characterised by a drive for liberalisation and WTO compatibility 
which, despite the less aesthetic overall results, has largely been 
achieved. Without delving into the discussion on the drivers behind 
this agenda, it is clear that interest-related, ideological and institutional 
factors have played a role. A deeply rooted belief among European 
policymakers, especially in the European Commission, of the benefits 
of deep regional integration according to the “EU model”, has certainly 
been a key factor. At the same time, the EU has put increased emphasis 
on ethical values in its trade arrangements with developing countries, as 
will be discussed in the next section.
A more ethical agenda
Over the past decade, EU trade policy discourse has put more and 
more emphasis on values such as democracy, governance, human and 
labour rights, and environmental sustainability, all of which are closely 
linked to broad conceptualisation of “development”. Although the 
ideological centre of gravity has shifted towards the centre-right and 
an economic crisis has affected most European countries, which has 
contributed to a radicalisation of the liberalisation agenda as discussed 
in the previous section, ethical values seem to stand out more than ever. 
The provisional culmination of this discursive evolution is the Trade for 
All document of 2015. Commissioner Malmström’s trade strategy calls 
for “more responsible trade” as early as the subtitle and dedicates an 
entire chapter to “A trade and investment policy based on values”. 
Interestingly, the ethical trade agenda not only reveals itself in the 
“traditional” unilateral GSP and bilateral trade agreements, but also in 
more innovative arrangements that only indirectly relate to traditional 
trade instruments.
First, the EU’s GSP has created a separate “Special Incentive 
Arrangement for Sustainable Development and Good Governance” 
(GSP+) system since 2005. While the previous GSP already included a 
number of labour and environmental principles, this GSP+ has extended 
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and elaborated the system. In order to benefit from more generous 
market access, developing countries had to ratify and effectively 
implement core international conventions on human and labour rights, 
environmental protection, and good governance. The most recent 
GSP reform, which came into force in 2014, further strengthens the 
conditionality scheme, in the sense that applications for GSP+ become 
more stringent and violations are more closely monitored. The European 
Commission conducts an annual analysis (“scorecard”) of the extent 
to which the conventions have been applied, based on the reports 
of relevant monitoring bodies (e.g. the expert committees of the 
International Labour Organization (ILO)). This evaluation is then sent 
to the third-country governments, who are required to respond within 
three months. Wherever it is deemed appropriate, the issues raised in 
the report are subsequently discussed with the partner government. The 
follow-up process can also involve a monitoring visit. 
Second, the new free trade agreements have consistently included a 
dedicated chapter on “sustainable development”. While EU bilateral 
agreements have included an “essential elements” clause on human 
rights since the 1990s, and some ad hoc provisions on labour-related 
cooperation since the 1970s, the sustainable development chapter is a 
novelty. Compared to previous agreements, the new generation of EU 
trade agreements extends the content, governance, and enforceability 
of provisions on sustainable development. In terms of content, the 
parties typically commit to comply with a number of international 
social (the ILO’s Core Conventions and Decent Work Agenda) and 
environmental commitments (such as the Convention on Biological 
Diversity or Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of 
Wild Fauna and Flora). In terms of governance, the chapters establish 
civil society meetings, both within and between the parties, which 
are tasked with monitoring and discussing the implementation of the 
sustainable development principles. There is also an intergovernmental 
meeting to address these issues, which can engage in a dialogue with 
the civil society mechanism. In the case of a conflict, government 
consultations can be established, followed, if necessary, by a Panel 
of Experts. However, in the case of non-compliance no sanctions are 
provided. The EU’s approach is indeed based on persuasion, dialogue 
and cooperation. 
Third, the EU has undertaken various initiatives in the realm of corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) and fair trade. CSR and fair trade are briefly 
mentioned in the sustainable development chapter of some trade 
agreements. More interestingly, beyond the scope of trade instruments 
the EU has engaged in some activities linking trade and ethical values. 
Three examples are worth mentioning. The first example concerns 
the possibility for national and local authorities in the EU to include 
fair trade criteria in their public tenders. Even though the Commission 
issued Buying Social, a guide to taking into account social considerations 
in public procurement in 2010, it is only since the reform of the EU 
public procurement rules in 2014 that these authorities are legally 
enabled to include such criteria in their tenders (such as fair trade 
origin, or the requirement to pay a minimum price). This new dynamic 
in procurement rules stems from a number of EU member states that 
proved to be more ambitious in including fair trade criteria in public 
tenders, resulting in a number of cases before the European Court of 
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Justice since the mid-2000s. Most famously, in 2012 the court supported 
the decision of the province of North Holland to include fair trade 
criteria in its public tendering for coffee machines. The more restrictive 
interpretation of the European Commission was challenged by the court, 
which has been hailed by the fair trade organisations as an important 
victory. Nevertheless, it remains to be seen to what extent these new 
regulations could entail an Europeanisation of fair trade provisions 
in public procurement practices. In this context the use of organic 
certification criteria in the EU green public procurement toolkit could be 
seen as an inspiring example. 
A second example concerns regulations that focus on trade in specific 
products. Measures are being taken to fight wildlife trafficking and 
trade in tools for torture and executions. The most elaborated initiatives 
however are the regulations on (illegal) timber and conflict minerals. 
These are based on a mix of policies (trade, development, internal 
market, and environment) and approaches (trade conditionality, 
reporting obligations, multi-stakeholder dialogue) and aim at improving 
social, environmental and human rights causes. The FLEGT (Forest Law 
Enforcement, Governance and Trade) Action Plan adopted in 2003 
comprises development cooperation, trade agreements between the EU 
and timber-producing countries, public procurement, private sector and 
civil society involvement and more, in order to combat illegal logging 
and strengthen forest governance. Concrete progress has been slow, as 
most interested timber-producing countries are still in the negotiation 
phase. So far only Indonesia, Cameroon, Central Africa, Ghana, Liberia 
and the Republic of Congo are implementing the trade agreements 
enabling the FLEGT Action Plan. The Conflict Minerals regulation aims 
(when approved)  at breaking the vicious cycle between trade in minerals 
(more specifically tin, tantalum, tungsten and gold) and the financing 
of conflicts. At the time of writing trialogue consultations have been 
concluded in order to find a balance between the positions of the 
European Commission and European Council (voluntary guidelines) and 
the Parliament (binding rules). The draft regulation contains a mixed 
approach with binding requirements for upstream companies (mines, 
processors, traders, smelters and refiners) and recommendations for 
downstream companies (EU manufacturers). 
A third example of EU fair trade policies that go beyond traditional 
trade instruments concerns the Sustainability Compact. This initiative 
brings together the EU, Bangladesh, the US and Canada, as well as the 
ILO. Its distinct, multi-stakeholder approach might become exemplary 
in a context where more and more attention is given to the need for 
sustainable supply chains. The Rana Plaza collapse in Bangladesh in 
2013 triggered a wave of awareness and demands for transparency and 
just working conditions in the garment industry in developing countries 
from consumers and activists. The European Commission responded to 
this drama by launching the Sustainability Compact to improve respect 
for labour rights, factory safety and responsible business conduct in the 
ready-made garment industry in Bangladesh. Since its creation in 2013, 
there have been several follow-up meetings and a technical report taking 
stock of what has been done to implement these objectives. So far, 
tangible results are little and critical voices have highlighted the failure of 
Bangladesh to comply with the compact and the absence of changes on 
the ground.
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Conclusion: solving the trilemma
The Trade for All strategy is remarkably explicit on promoting values 
through trade. While offering some space for action and advocacy, 
the ethical trade agenda should be put into perspective. First, the 
discourse is not entirely new. It goes back to the EU’s emphasis on 
moral responsibility towards the former colonies of the member states. 
The Schuman Declaration, the Rome Treaty, the first Lomé Convention, 
and the Cotonou Agreement have all been presented as development-
friendly initiatives witnessing a spirit of partnership between the EU 
and developing countries. More recently, Pascal Lamy’s tenure as a 
trade commissioner (1999-2004) displayed a strong emphasis on value 
promotion through trade. 
Second, enforceability of ethical principles in bilateral trade agreements 
and the unilateral GSP remains limited. While market-related issues 
such as tariffs, sanitary standards, investment provisions and intellectual 
property rights can be enforced, the EU’s approach to sustainable 
development through trade remains largely cooperative and seems 
subordinate to what are considered “real” trade issues. Trade 
agreements have an “essential elements” clause on democracy and 
human rights, but sanctions have never involved trade flows. The new 
procurement rules offer possibilities, but again these are enabling for 
public authorities rather than forcing them to use fair trade criteria. New 
initiatives such as the timber and conflict minerals regulations and the 
Sustainability Compact may be promising, but have been criticised for 
lacking effectiveness in practice. 
Third, these initiatives do not challenge the underlying neoliberal 
paradigm that has characterised EU trade policy since the mid-1990s. A 
number of interventionist measures “NIEO style” have been abolished, 
most prominently the Lomé system of unilateral preferences, export 
stabilisation schemes and commodity arrangements. More important 
than the practical deficiencies of the “old-fashioned” Lomé system 
are its ideological underpinnings, which have been fundamentally 
challenged. Within the neoliberal trade paradigm, different policy ideas 
are possible, putting more or less emphasis on values or interests. This 
depends on several factors, including the party political constellation 
in the Council of Ministers and the political profile of the trade 
commissioner. For instance, trade commissioners Peter Mandelson 
(2004-2008) and Karel De Gucht (2010-2014) stressed the economic 
interests behind free trade, whereas commissioners Pascal Lamy (1999-
2004), Catherine Ashton (2008-2009) and now Cecilia Malmström 
(2014-) put more emphasis on values in trade policy. 
In this regard, the distinction between underlying “paradigms” and 
concrete “policy ideas” is essential. It also helps to understand the 
interplay between the three trends that were identified in this chapter, 
thereby solving the impossible triangle. The increasing emphasis on 
ethical trade emphasis should be situated against the background of 
the paradigm shift towards neoliberal free trade, which has so far not 
been challenged by European policymakers. Limited enforceability 
and practical problems limit the effectiveness of these initiatives. This 
chapter has shown that while developing countries have not been at 
the centre of EU trade policies over the past decades, the liberalisation 
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agenda that was staged in the 1990s has been implemented. New 
ethical initiatives have not been able to compensate for this – perhaps 
they have even further legitimised the growing number of free trade 
agreements concluded by the EU. The limits of ethical trade initiatives 
within the neoliberal paradigm are likely to come to the surface in the 
coming years, as public protests against the TTIP and EU-Canada trade 
agreements already indicate. 
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